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MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY TO REMOTE PURCHASERS
FOR "ECONOMIC LOSS" DAMAGES-TORT OR CONTRACT?
The products liability field is one of the fastest changing in our law
today and the changes have steadily extended liability.1 The first cases
holding a manufacturer liable for injuries caused by his product in the
absence of privity of contract used a negligence theory 2 Their theory
was liability based on fault. Once liability was firmly established for
negligence, 3 theories other than fault began to receive recognition as justi-
fication for holding the manufacturer liable even though he had exercised
all reasonable care.4
One rationale of strict liability without fault or privity is that the
manufacturer is better able to distribute the risk of injury than is the
injured consumer. 5 Underlying this thought is the assumption that the
cost of insuring against such losses will be distributed by the manufacturer
to the consuming public by way of higher prices. 6 A second justification
is that the manufacturer by placing the goods on the market makes an
express or implied representation to the public that they are suitable and
safe for use.
7
Coupled with these justifications for liability is the argument which
has traditionally been employed against the privity requirement in the
products liability field 8 -that regardless of the privity requirement the
'Jaeger, How Strict Is the Mamfacturer's Liability? Recent Developments, 48
MARQ. L. REv. 293 (1965) ; Prosser, Products Liability in General, 1965 CLEV. B.A.J.
149; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
2 The landmark decision in this area was MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (Cardozo, J.).
3 MacPherson has been accepted by all jurisdictions in the United States, PRossER,
TORTS § 96, at 661 (3d ed. 1964), with the possible exception of Mississippi. See
Cox v. Laws, 244 Miss. 696, 145 So. 2d 703 (1962). But see Grey v. Hayes-Sammons
Chem. Co., 310 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1962), purporting to apply Mississippi law and
accepting MacPherson.
4 See, e.g., Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Low of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) ; Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN.
L. REv. 1077 (1965); James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable
Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. Rsv. 923 (1957).
6 This rationale is well stated by Justice Traynor in his concurring opinion in
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944).
6 The assumption has been criticized by legal authorities. See, e.g., Plant, Strict
Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing
View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957). See the dissenting opinion of Justice Burke
in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E.2d 81, 83,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595 (1963). For the actuarial problems involved see, Morris,
Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70
YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
7 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa
1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960) ; Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965);
Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
8 See 2 FRumER & FRI nmm"r, PRODUCTs LiABmrry § 44 (1964) ; PRossaa, TORTS
§ 97, at 674 (3d ed. 1964).
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purchaser can, in most cases, maintain an action against his seller based
on an implied warranty and the seller can then sue the manufacturer for
indemnity.9 Recovery through this circuitous route, however, may be
frustrated by form disclaimers, insolvency, statutes of limitation, or lack
of jurisdiction. Therefore the law should allow a direct action by the pur-
chaser against the manufacturer.
While these arguments were first used to justify manufacturers' lia-
bility where defective food or drink caused physical injury,'0 strict liability
has now been extended beyond food to cases involving a wide variety of
products." Although the doctrine was originally restricted to products
which were "inherently dangerous," an examination of the kinds of prod-
ducts involved in recent cases shows that this early requirement has
generally been abandoned.' 2  While most of the decisions in the strict
liability area involved personal injuries, damage to property has recently
become recoverable in some courts.' 3
The most recent extension of liability has been to recovery by a pur-
chaser against a manufacturer when the only injury was "economic loss." 14
9 Ibid.
10 Parks v. G. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Jackson
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914).
":Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), affd, 304 F.2d 149
(9th Cir. 1962) (hula skirt) ; Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d
919 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1962) (automobile); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (power tool) ; Simpson v.
Powered Prods. of Mich., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (C.P. 1963) (power
golf cart); McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962)
(children's playground equipment); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182
(Ill. Ct. App. 1965) (tractor unit); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-
Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961) (automobile); Spence v.
Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873
(1958) (cinder blocks); Midwest Game Co. v. M. F. A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d
547 (Mo. 1959) (fish food); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960) (automobile) ; Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d
432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963) (airplane); Lang v. General Motors
Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965) (truck tractor); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.,
191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959) (truck) ; General Motors Corp. v. Dodson,
47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960) (automobile).
12 Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149
(9th Cir. 1962) (hula skirt); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla.
1953) (dictum) (seeds) ; Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E. C. "Red"
Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958) (underground cable). For cases
collected in the nonprivity negligence area, see 1 FRUimER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTS
LiABILITY § 5.03[1] [a] (1964).
'3 Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Duck-
worth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Picker X-Ray Corp.
v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1962); Hoskins v.
Jackson Grain Co., supra note 12; Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E. C.
"Red" Cornelius, Inc., supra note 12; Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d
182 (Ill. Ct. App. 1965); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber,
Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders &
Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Morrow v. Caloric
Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963); Pabon v. Hackensack Auto. Sales,
Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (App. Div. 1960); 50 New Walden, Inc. v.
Federal Ins. Co., 39 Misc. 2d 460, 241 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct. 1963) ; Lang v. General
Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa.
Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
'4 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965)
(express warranty); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d
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"Economic loss" is defined as the diminution in the value of the product
because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes
for which it was manufactured and sold. In recent decisions two leading
state courts 15 allowed recovery for economic loss damages by purchasers
against manufacturers with whom they were not in privity on two different
legal theories.1 6
The plaintiff in the New Jersey case of Santor v. A. & M. Karagheu-
sian, Inc.,17 had purchased advertised carpeting from a retailer. Later he
noticed an unusual line in it; but the dealer reassured him. The carpet got
worse, and after eight months the plaintiff went back to the dealer, only
to find that the dealer had gone out of business. At the trial the manu-
facturer admitted that the carpeting had been defectively manufactured.
The plaintiff recovered in the trial court on an implied warranty of mer-
chantability without privity even though the damage was limited to loss
of the value of the carpeting. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey said that the manufacturer's liability could be cast in simpler
form:
Ordinarily there is no contract in a real sense between a manu-
facturer and an expected ultimate consumer of his product. The
fact is that as a matter of public policy the law has imposed on
manufacturers a duty to such persons irrespective of contract or
a privity relationship between them. Such a concept expressed in
terms of implied warranty of fitness or merchantability bespeaks
a sui generis cause of action. Its character is hybrid, having its
commencement in contract and its termination in tort.'8
305 (1965) (strict liability in tort); Randy Knitware, Inc. v. American Cyanamid
Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (express warranty);
Lang v. General Motors Corp., supra note 13 (implied warranty) ; Inglis v. American
Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965) (express warranty and
dictum that in the absence of an express warranty a warranty might be implied).
But see Henry v. John W. Eshelman & Sons, 209 A.2d 46 (R.I. 1965) (strict liability
in tort will not be extended to economic loss damages and privity was necessary
for an implied warranty action by a poultry farmer against the remote manufacturer
of defective chicken feed) ; Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056
(1960) (no recovery for economic loss when the express warranty limited the seller's
obligation to replacing defective parts and where the defect did not result in a danger-
ous or noxious instrumentality) ; Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965) (economic
loss suffered as a result of a tractor's defective manufacture was not recoverable by
a purchaser against a wholesaler with whom he was not in privity (dictum as to
manufacturer) ).
15 The California Supreme Court previously decided Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), which expressly
stated that strict liability in nonprivity personal injury cases lay in tort. The New
Jersey Supreme Court decided Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960), which was the landmark case establishing a manufacturer's
liability to a remote purchaser without proof of negligence.
16 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
17 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
18 Id. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311.
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The court held the manufacturer strictly liable in tort for the economic
loss damages.
While the New Jersey court was extending strict liability in tort by
refusing to recognize any significant difference between the case of the
defective rug and the earlier personal injury and property damage cases,
the California Supreme Court was making just such a distinction. The
plaintiff in Seely v. White Motor Co."9 entered into a conditional sales
contract with a dealer for the purchase of a truck manufactured by the
defendant. Plaintiff purchased the truck for use in his business of heavy
duty hauling. Upon taking possession of the truck, plaintiff found that
it bounced violently. For eleven months after the purchase the dealer,
with guidance from the manufacturer, made unsuccessful attempts to cor-
rect the bouncing. Finally the plaintiff stopped making payments and the
truck was repossessed. In the trial court the plaintiff recovered the money
paid on the purchase price and business profits lost because he was unable
to make normal use of the truck. In an opinion by Chief Justice Traynor,
the supreme court held that the manufacturer's express warranties, even
though they excluded all others and limited liability to repair and replace-
ment of defective parts,2 0 allowed recovery for economic loss damages.
The court said:
The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that
it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the
sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to gov-
ern the distinct problem of physical injuries. . . . Although the
rules of warranty frustrate rational compensation for physical
injury, they function well in a commercial setting. . . These
rules determine the quality of the product the manufacturer prom-
ises and thereby determine the quality he must deliver.21
Both California and New Jersey are among the majority of jurisdic-
tions which have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.m Both are
also, however, in the growing minority of jurisdictions which have de-
clared that in products liability cases where physical injury has occurred,
liability of the manufacturer to the remote purchaser must rest in tort
19 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Cal. 1965).
20 The warranty said: "The White Motor Company hereby warrants each new
motor vehicle sold by it to be free from defects in material and workmanship under
normal use and service, its obligation under the warranty being limited to making
good at its factory any part or parts thereof." 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
21403 P.2d at 149-50, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21-22.
22 More than forty jurisdictions had adopted the Uniform Commercial Code by
July 1, 1965. The facts of both cases preceded the adoption of the Code in California
and New Jersey, but the Code had been adopted when the cases were decided. See
UNrFORm LAWS ANN. 5 (Supp. 1965), for a list of states which have adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code and the effective dates.
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rather than on the law of sales23 The tort approach had been advocated
earlier by Dean Prosser in his classic article 24 in order to overcome the
privity of contract problem, especially in cases where the injured person
was not the purchaser of the product. According to Dean Prosser the
"intricacies of the law of sales" were ill suited to personal injury cases.25
The Supreme Court of California followed this analysis in the 1963 case
of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.2 6 where the plaintiff, who was
injured by a power tool purchased by his wife, maintained an action
against the manufacturer. There was no negligence and the manufacturer
argued that recovery should be denied since the plaintiff failed to comply
with the notice provisions of the sales law.27 Justice Traynor employed the
risk distribution rationale 2 8 to say that in nonprivity personal injury cases
the liability lay in tort and therefore the notice requirement was in-
appropriate.
Both the Santor and Seely courts discussed the Greennan decision.
The New Jersey court approved the Greenman analysis and stated that no
distinction should be drawn based on the kind of injury that has occurred.
The Seely court distinguished its Greenman holding as limited to the
"distinct" problem of physical injury, saying that when the injury is
"economic loss" the appropriate source of standards is the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. The California court in moving away from the tort ap-
proach concluded that when the injury is economic loss rather than per-
sonal injury the reason for holding the manufacturer liable is not that he
is necessarily better able to insure against the risk but that he has
breached an implied or express representation of quality. The manufac-
turer's ability to forecast the extent of potential liability and plan for it,
when it is limited to the purchase price of the product, is no greater than
the purchaser's. In a personal injury case, however, an injured purchaser
might suffer damage many times greater than the value of the product.
Therefore when the injury is economic loss the manufacturer is held
liable for inducing reasonable consumer expectations, rather than as a
better risk bearer, and the warranty provisions of the sales law would seem
to afford appropriate standards.
2 3 Delaney v. Townmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) (New York law);
Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (Texas law); Greeno
v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (Indiana law); Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. Ct. App. 1965) ; Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery
Distrib. Co., 33 U.S.L. WEIn 2651 (Ky. Ct. App. June 4, 1965) ; Goldberg v. Kolls-
man Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963);
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), ToRTs § 402 A (1964).
24 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Conmeer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
25 Id. at 1134.
2659 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
27 The plaintiff notified the manufacturer of the injury ten and one-half months
after it occurred. See UNIFomu COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607.
2859 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
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The New Jersey court while emphasizing the representation ra-
tionale,29 saw no reason to shift the doctrine and held that liability of
manufacturers of defective products to purchasers rested in tort and was
not governed by sales law notions. The Santor court, however, was not
without judicial precedent for classifying liability based on a breach of
representation as tort. The 1932 case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.3 0 held
that an express statement in the manufacturer's literature that the glass of
his windshield was "shatterproof" made it liable, without knowledge that
the representation was untrue, to one who bought the car from a dealer,
and suffered personal injury when a pebble struck the glass and shattered
it. The Santor decision, however, goes beyond Baxter not only in allow-
ing recovery for economic loss damages but in basing the manufacturer's
liability on an implied rather than an express representation of quality.
In order to evaluate the Seely and Santor approaches it is necessary to
compare their solutions to various problems in the economic loss area.
Under the New Jersey tort approach the purchaser must first prove that
the product contained a defect which arose either out of the design or
manufacture, or while the article was in the control of the manufacturer.
The court defines "defective" as "not reasonably fit for the ordinary pur-
poses for which such articles are sold and used." 31 Thus the standards
for minimum quality are the same as those imposed by the implied war-
ranty of merchantability section of the Uniform Commercial Code.32 For
the New Jersey court this minimum standard of merchantability is "implicit
in the presence of the product on the market." 33 Thus if the manufacturer
makes express representations in his advertising, New Jersey would no
doubt hold him to the reasonable expectations of purchasers relying on the
representations. This is consistent with the Code provision on express
warranties.84
The plaintiff under the Santor tort approach must also prove that the
defect proximately caused the injury or damage to the ultimate purchaser
29Although it emphasized the representation rationale, the New Jersey court
also said: "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the cost of injuries or
damage . . . resulting from defective products, is borne by the makers of the products
who put them in the channels of trade, rather than by the injured or damaged persons
who ordinarily are powerless to protect themselves." 44 N.J. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312.
30 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd on rehearing, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932).
3144 N.J. at 67, 207 A.2d at 313; see Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of De-
fective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965).
3 2 UNIORM CommERCIAL CODE § 2-314. Compare comment 7: "In case of doubt
as to what quality is intended, the price at which a merchant closes a contract is an
excellent index of the nature and scope of his obligation under the present section,"
with Santor: "[One measure of the manufacturer's obligation necessarily must be
the price at which the manufacturer reasonably contemplated that the article might
be sold," 44 N.J. at 67, 207 A.2d at 313.
33 Ibid.
3 4 UNIFORM COmMERCAL CODE § 2-313(1). Comment 2 to § 2-313 says that the
Code was "not designed in any way to disturb those lines of case law growth which
have recognized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to
the direct parties to such a contract." See Advertised-Product Liability (A Syln-
posium), 8 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 521 (1959) ; 42 MAIQ. L. REv. 521 (1959).
ECONOMIC LOSS TO REMOTE PURCHASERS
or reasonably expected consumer. The proximate cause standard, while
usually associated with tort law, is also not unfamiliar to the law of con-
tractual warranty, and the Code speaks of recovery of damages "proxi-
mately resulting from any breach of warranty." 35
The most troublesome problem leading courts to resort to tort law
in suits by purchasers against manufacturers was the requirement of
privity of contract under the sales law.30 Avoiding the privity requirement
permits any consumer to recover directly from a manufacturer who was
not his immediate seller 3 7 The comment to the privity section of the
Uniform Commercial Code states that the section is "not intended to enlarge
or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties,
given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive
chain." s Thus the Santor approach was merely making law where the
Code is silent. When the injury is economic loss the case law in this
area should be no different than it would be under the Code.
In personal injury cases after Santor the New Jersey court has indi-
cated that a form of contributory negligence or assumption of risk would
be a defense to tort actions like Santor.39 Speaking about this defense
the court said that "a manufacturer or seller is entitled to expect a normal
use of his product" and that the doctrine of strict liability in tort "should
not be extended so as to negate this expectation." 40  It would seem that
this defense would also be applicable in an economic loss case where the
3 5 UNIFOR CoMMEcRIAL CODE § 2-715(2) (b). In an economic loss case, once
it is proved that the product left the control of the manufacturer in a defective con-
dition the purchaser has shown the requisite causal connection. The proximate cause
standard would be used where the defect causes further tangible property damage, see
note 54 infra, or where the purchaser suffers business losses in the form of lost profits,
see note 55 infra.
36 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
37There are two types of privity problems, horizontal and vertical. Horizontal
privity involves the question of who besides the purchaser should have a right of
action against the manufacturer or seller for injury caused by a defective product.
This is usually associated with personal injury cases where a member of the purchaser's
family or even an unrelated bystander is injured by a defective product. See Note,
Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 916 (1964). Section
2-318 of the Code extends the seller's warranty for personal injuries to "any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the
goods. . . ." But the problem of horizontal privity does not affect the case where
the injury is only economic loss or where the damage is limited to the purchased
product itself.
3sUNnioR_ Co mERcIAL CODE § 2-318, comment 3. There is some doubt as to
what weight should be given to the comments to the Uniform Commercial Code.
While only the text of the Code was enacted by the legislature, the comments may be
persuasive in areas where the statutory provisions are silent. See HoNNoLD, LAw OF
SALES AND SALES FINANCING 17-19 (1962).
89 Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 214 A.2d 18 (N.J. 1965) (per curiam) ; Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965); see 1 FRUMER
& FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LItiuirri § 16A[3] [a] (1964) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 95, at 656-57
(3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402 A, comment n (1965); Keeton,
Assumption of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965).
4 o Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., supra note 39, at 20.
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consumer misused the product or could not reasonably have expected it
to perform for some particular purpose. A court handling such a situa-
tion under the Code would say that the implied warranty of merchantability
was not breached if the consumer misused the product 41 or used it for
some unusual purpose not communicated to the seller.4
Another problem both under the Code approach and under the tort
approach is the effect to be given the manufacturer's disclaimer of liability.
Under the Code warranties can be disclaimed if the disclaimer is in writing
that is "conspicuous" and fairly apprises the buyer of the risk he is run-
ning.43 But under section 2-302 "unconscionable" contract provisions will
not be enforced by the courts and under section 2-719(3) "limitation of
consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable" but "limitation of damages where the
loss is commercial is not." 4  It is difficult to say whether a manufac-
turer's disclaimer as to the quality of the product which clearly brings the
point home to the purchaser will be upheld under the Santor tort theory.
A buyer purchasing a product in the face of such a disclaimer may be
denied recovery under the assumption of risk defense put forth in the
post-Santor cases.45 In other words, the buyer might be held to have
deliberately and unreasonably proceeded to encounter a known danger.46
If the rationale of liability in these cases is that of implied or express rep-
resentation and not enterprise liability based on risk distribution, the
manufacturer should not be held liable when no reasonable buyer expecta-
tions are upset. While the application of the disclaimer provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code to consumer sales is a complex problem,4 7 the
41 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2): "Goods to be merchantable must at
least be such as . . . (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used ... "
42 Section 2-315 of the Code says an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose arises if the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know the particular
purpose for which the goods were required and if the buyer was relying on the seller's
skill and judgment to furnish suitable goods. The Code distinguishes the implied
warranty of fitness from the implied warranty of merchantability, § 2-314. Thus if
the purchaser never deals with the manufacturer, the manufacturer should not be liable
in tort when the use of the product is not within the reasonable expectation of the
purchaser and the manufacturer.
43 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-316(2), (3) (a).
44 The warranty in Seely was said to be "expressly in lieu of all other warranties,
expressed or implied." 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20. This was probably an
attempt by the manufacturer to limit liability to replacement of defective parts and
to exclude liability for consequential damages. An argument can be made that the
Seely court's action failed to give effect to this limitation. The court did not discuss
§2-719(3) of the Code which seems to allow limitation of consequential damages in
consumer goods cases where the loss is commercial.
45 See note 39 supra.
46 See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d at 782-83
(N.J. 1965).
47 See, e.g., Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 47 MARQ. L. REv. 127 (1963) ; Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUm. L. REV. 629 (1943) ; Note, Disclaimers of
Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HlAxv. L. REv. 318 (1963).
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problem will be no less complex under the tort approach. The flexibility
afforded courts under the tort approach is thus probably not significantly
greater than that afforded by a court's power to strike down disclaimers
as "unconscionable" under section 2-302 of the Code.
48
Section 2-607(3) (a) of the Uniform Commercial Code states that
where tender has been accepted "the buyer must within a reasonable time
after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller
of breach or be barred from any remedy . . . ." This was one of the
problems which led the California Supreme Court in Greenman to hold
that the liability lay in tort. The comment to this section of the Code says
that "a reasonable time" may be extended in the case of a consumer as
the notification requirement "is designed to defeat commercial bad faith,
not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy." 49 It is difficult, in
light of the flexibility allowed by the term "a reasonable time," to see why
this requirement should force a court to abandon the Code's standards.
Certainly when the injury is only the loss of his bargain the consumer
should also be held to at least a good faith effort to notify either his seller
or the manufacturer of his claim that the product is defective.50
There is also a question whether the Santor court will apply the Code's
statute of limitations which provides that "an action for breach of any
contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of
action accrues." 51 Under the Code a "cause of action has accrued when
the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of
the breach." 52 While in personal injury cases the court may wish to have
the statute run from the injury rather than the sale, there should be no sub-
stantial objection to applying the Code statute of limitations when the
injury is economic loss. In such implied warranty cases a lapse of time
longer than four years might create a serious question whether the product
48 See Note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 401 (1961). The Seely court distinguished the case where the
entire industry disclaims liability through a form disclaimer thus forcing the pur-
chaser to either go without the product or take it with the disclaimer:
Unlike the defendant in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. . . . White
is not seeking to enforce an industry-wide disclaimer of liability for personal
injuries. Here, plaintiff, whose business is trucking, could have shopped
around until he found the truck that would fulfill his business needs. He
could be fairly charged with the risk that the product would not match his
economic expectations, unless the manufacturer agreed that it would.
403 P.2d at 151-52, 45 Cal. Rptr. 23-24. The implication is that a disclaimer like the
one in Henningsen might not be upheld.
4 9 UNIFORM COMMEUmLCaI. CODE § 2-607(3) (a), comment 4.
G0 Comment 5 to § 2-607 says that "in regard to discovery of defects and the
giving of notice within a reasonable time after acceptance," the notice requirement is
not intended to apply to injured guests or relatives under §2-318 since they have
"nothing to do with acceptance." But the comment goes on to say that: "However,
the reason of this section does extend to requiring the beneficiary to notify the seller
that an injury has occurred. . . . [E]ven a beneficiary can be properly held to the
use of good faith in notifying, once he has had time to become aware of the legal
situation."
5 1 UNIFORM CoMMRcIL CODE § 2-725(1).
62 UNIFORM CommEgcIAL CODE § 2-725 (2).
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was really defective and would impose a heavy burden on the manufacturer.
Finally, differences in the length of tort and contract statutes of limitation
in some jurisdictions might present problems in decision of some cases
especially where the period in which tort actions may be brought is sig-
nificantly shorter.
Overall, however, it seems that in economic loss cases the Santor tort
approach should not reach results significantly different from the results
that will be reached by the Seely court under the Code. While in per-
sonal injury cases the problem of allowing injured persons other than the
purchaser to recover may afford some reason to work outside the Code,53
no such problem is presented where the damage is only the value of the
buyer's bargain or is limited to damage to the purchased product itself.
In personal injury cases the rationale of risk distribution is one which is
usually associated with the policy of tort law. When the rationale is based
on the manufacturer's implied or express representation of quality, how-
ever, the standards from the law of sales would seem to be more ap-
propriate.m
The Santor court's reason for not applying the Uniform Commercial
Code's standards must be that these standards were meant to cover
transactions between commercial parties and are not applicable to non-
privity transactions involving an ordinary consumer. Yet the standards
of the Code would seem more appropriate when the damage is loss of the
he Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Hochgertel v. Canada Dry
Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), held that a bartender in a club who was
injured when a bottle of soda water exploded as it was standing on the bar could
not sue the defendant bottler who had sold and delivered the soda to the bartender's
employer. The court in an unduly restrictive use of the Code standards said that
§ 2-318 of the Code "gives no basis for the extension of the existing warranty to an
employee of the purchaser." Id. at 612, 187 A.2d at 577 (emphasis in original).
54The Seely court said that the doctrine of strict liability in tort employed in
personal injury cases should be extended to tangible property damages. Thus the
court said that if, on the Seely facts, the plaintiff could have proved that the automobile
accident was caused by the defect then he could recover the damage to the car on a
tort theory. 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24. It is questionable whether the
court is drawing the appropriate line. With the growing availability of insurance
today it is uncertain whether the purchaser or the manufacturer is better able to
distribute the risk of property damage. The line might be drawn between personal
injury and all property damage including economic loss.
Moreover, by allowing recovery for damage to the purchased product itself the
Seely court distinguished between recovery for the loss of value from a defect in
a product and damage to the product caused by the defect. The court seems to be
borrowing from the nonprivity negligence area where some cases have held that to
recover property damage it must have resulted from an accident "involving some
violence or collision with external objects, not a mere marked deterioration, or even
a complete ruin brought about by internal defect." Fentress v. Van Etta Motors,
157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 866, 323 P.2d 227, 229 (Super. Ct. 1958); Trans-World Air-
lines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), aff'd inem.,
2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546, appeal denied, 2 App. Div. 2d 745, 153 N.Y.S.2d
550 (1956). The "accident requirement" in the negligence area has been criticized
for overlooking that it is the injury and the causal connection to the defect in the
product which makes the negligence actionable rather than the exact manner in
which the injury occurred. See 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 197 (1957). The rationale of the
"accident requirement" must be based on the greater risk of personal injury in such
cases. Another problem is that with many products an "accident" cannot clearly
be distinguished from internal deterioration. For this reason a better line might be
between damage to the purchased product and damage caused to other property.
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buyer's bargain in a sale than would the body of products liability law
built up in the personal injury area. Moreover, it is questionable what the
Santor court will do when the plaintiff is a commercial purchaser. While
the opinion contains no indication of any such limitation, such a commer-
cial transaction would appear within the intended penumbra of the Code.
When both manufacturer and ultimate consumer are commercial en-
terprises the manufacturer should be able to shift liability for economic
loss onto the purchaser. In such a case the New Jersey court might uphold
the disclaimer by saying that the commercial purchaser "assumed the
risk." The invocation of these terms between commercial parties would be
as inappropriate as the invocation of the privity requirement had been pre-
viously in the personal injury cases. On the other hand, the New Jersey
court could decide that the nonprivity tort doctrine applies only to "con-
sumers" and not to purchasers who are buying for business use or for
resale. New Jersey would then be saying that "commercial buyers" are
governed by the Code's standards while "ordinary consumers" are governed
by the tort doctrine.55 The Seely court is in essence saying that the Code
standards should be used in cases involving "commercial transactions" and
defining them as cases where the damage is only economic loss.
Under both Seely and Santor the purchaser is not barred by lack of
privity from suing the manufacturer of the defective product when the in-
jury is economic loss. This alone puts New Jersey and California well
ahead of the great majority of jurisdictions where the "assault on privity"
has not come so far.56 The two courts differ only on the question whether
the doctrine in this area should grow from the tort concept or whether the
Uniform Commercial Code should be the starting premise for judicial rea-
soning. While the results under the two doctrines may not turn out to be
significantly different, there would seem to be a certain judicial impro-
priety in ignoring a statute dealing with substantially the same area as the
case before the courtY7  Moreover, the tort rationale of risk distribution
and the doctrine of assumption of risk, while appropriate in personal injury
cases, seem wholly inappropriate when the injury is only the loss of the
value of the purchaser's bargain. It would indeed be ironic if the tort
doctrine which was evolved to rescue the personal injury area from the
"intricacies of the law of sales" were to imprison the economic loss area
with inapposite tort concepts.
55 Justice Peters in his separate opinion in Seely said that strict liability in tort
should be extended to economic loss whenever an "ordinary consumer" was involved.
He felt that the plaintiff in the Seely case who bought the truck for use in his business
of heavy duty hauling and was suing for the purchase price and lost profits was an
"ordinary consumer." 403 P.2d at 157-58, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30. By not classifying
a suit for lost business profits as "commercial" Justice Peters appears to leave no
alternative for courts in drawing the line between commercial and noncommercial
cases other than to examine the size and bargaining power of the plaintiff's business
in each case.
56For jurisdictions which have allowed recovery by a purchaser against the
remote manufacturer of a defective product for economic loss damages, see note
14 supra.57 See generally MIsrKIN & MORIuS, ON LAw Ix CouRTs 514-23 (1965).
